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I. INTRODUCTION
The Republic of South Africa and the United States are
thousands of miles apart, yet their histories share one important
characteristic: the attempt to establish multi-racial societies
peacefully. In the United States, solutions have been temporary
and ever-changing throughout our history. From our Constitu-
tion's statement that blacks were to be counted for three-fifths rep-
resentational worth as compared to white freemen,' to the Dred
Scott2 decision just before the Civil War which held a black slave
to be not more than a mere piece of property, to the Plessy v. Fer-
guson3 Supreme Court decision at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury which established the separate but equal rule, to our present
one-man-one-vote standard,4 the United States has experienced
considerable difficulty in achieving equality among its various ra-
cial groups.
South Africa also has struggled with this perplexing problem.
As a British colony, South Africa abolished slavery in 1834, long
before its abolition in the United States.5 After the Anglo-Boer
War of 1899-1902,6 the Act of Union, which gave South Africa her
independence, benignly neglected the problem of the franchise for
* Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration, University of Iowa.
BA-., City University of New York, 1968; J.D., University of Illinois, 1971; Di-
ploma in International Law, Stockholm University, 1973. The author wishes
to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Mr. Robert Castle, class of 1981,
University of Iowa College of Law, in the preparation of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States... by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons... three fifths of all other Persons."
2. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5. It is estimated that there were 39,000 slaves in South Africa when, on 1 De-
cember 1834, they were declared free men, as were the slaves in other British
possessions. See R. LAcoUR-GAYET, A HIsTORY OF SoUTH AFRICA 71 (1977).
6. In South Africa, this war is referred to as the South African War.
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all nonwhites. 7 Since the four provinces which were joined had
different laws affecting the nonwhite franchise,8 there seemed no
possibility of compromise were the issue raised. This arrange-
ment lasted until 1948, about the same time that the United States
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of separate but equal.9
In the general election of 1948, the Afrikaner-dominated Nation-
alist Party won its first election, and has remained in power ever
since.10 By its rejection of a one-man-one-vote standard, the Na-
tionalist Party squarely faced the nonwhite franchise problem and
adopted a policy of separate development for racial groups in
South Africa." Throughout the world, this policy has come to be
known by its Afrikaans name: "apartheid."12 Advocates of
apartheid once feared that, because the nonwhite population out-
numbered the white population by a four-to-one ratio,13 the white
7. The Act of Union of 1910 debate expressed the hope that the people of "South
Africa, in the exercise of their undoubted and unfettered freedom, should
find it possible, sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, to modify the
provisions regarding the natives." R. LACouR-GAYET, supra note 5, at 242.
8. The Union of South Africa comprised four provinces: the Cape of Good Hope,
Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. In the Transvaal and Or-
ange Free State, non-Europeans had no right to vote; in Natal there was a
theoretical right to the franchise; in the Cape, however, a long tradition of the
colored franchise was accepted at the time of union. See generally 2 OxFoRD
HISTORY OF SouTH AFRICA 325-64 (1971). This right to vote by coloreds in the
Cape was taken away by the Nationalist Party-controlled Parliament in 1952,
amid much controversy which exists to this day. See R. LACOUR-GAYET,
supra note 5, at 299-300.
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Kentridge, The Pathology of
a Legal System: Criminal Justice in South Africa, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 603
(1980).
10. See S. VAN DER MERWE, THE ENVIRONMENT OF SOuTH AFRICAN BusINEss 75
(1976). Prior to 1948, the English-speaking white minority population had
been able to maintain political control of the country. Since the 1948 election,
the Afrikaner-dominated Nationalist Party has steadily increased its parlia-
mentary dominance. In the last general election, the Nationalist Party gath-
ered 134 of the 165 seats in the South African House of Assembly. 1980-1981
STATEsMAN's YEAR-BOOK 1069.
11. See Greenberg, South Africa and the American Experience, 54 N.Y.U. L REV.
3 (1979).
12. See generally SouTH AFRICAN INFORMATION SERVICE, SoUTH AFRICA 192-222
(1976).







S. VAN DER MERwE, supra note 10, at 55.
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population one day might be dominated if a common franchise
were ever adopted. Therefore, it became imperative to separate
the races and let them develop in their own territories.14 This con-
cept of separation of the races in South Africa has led to the estab-
lishment of separate homelands for all black South Africans.15
These homelands, or bantustans, compose the traditionally black
rural parts of the country and amount to about thirteen percent of
the land area of South Africa.16 When these homelands become
independent black states, black South Africans will lose all claims
to any political rights in the remainder of white South Africa.I7 In-
dependent black homelands, therefore, will mean that South Af-
rica, legally, will have no black citizens. Even though most blacks
would continue to live and work in South Africa, they would have
no political rights there.18 The Transkei became the first homeland
to receive its independence from South Africa on October 26, 1976.
Since then Bophuthatswana and Venda also have received their
independence.19
Since the American civil rights movement of the 1960s, 20 the
United States has grown more aware of the racial situation in
South Africa. That awareness has accompanied growing concern
about corporate social responsibility.2 ' In the American business
community, the debate about South Africa has focused upon the
propriety of American corporate investment in that country.
Those who protest the American corporate presence and participa-
tion in the apartheid system have pursued two tactics. First,
shareholders have presented resolutions to encourage corporate
14. The central statute on race classification is the Population Registration Act,
Act 30 of 1950, which provides for the Secretary of the Interior to register the
entire South African population according to race.
15. These homelands were created by the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act
No. 21 of 1971.
16. Richardson, Self-Deternination, Internatioinal Law and the South African
Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANs. L. 185, 187 (1978).
17. Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act No. 26 of 1970.
18. Id.
19. It should be noted that certain homeland leaders have refused to participate
in the procedure to gain independence. Most notable of these leaders has
been Chief Buthelezi of the KwaZulu homeland, who maintains that he and
his people have the right to South African citizenship. See Richardson, supra
note 16, at 189.
20. This movement was highlighted by passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e (1970), which guarantees full and equal treatment with-
out discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin. The constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Heart of Altanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
21. See, e.g., Note, Influencing Multinational Corporations: The Infant Formula
Marketing Controversy, 10 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & Poi. 125 (1977).
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management to evaluate the role of U.S. corporations in South Af-
rica in order to determine whether the investments serve to per-
petuate or to discourage apartheid. These resolutions prompted
more than one hundred American companies to adopt the Sullivan
Principles, a code of conduct governing corporate investment writ-
ten by the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, a black director of the General
Motors Corporation. The code calls for corporations to observe the
following principles:
Principle 1-Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work-
ing facilities.
Principle 2-Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
Principle 3-Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work
for the same period of time.
Principle 4-Initiation and development of training programs that will pre-
pare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other nonwhites for
supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs.
Principle 5-Increasing the number of blacks and other nonwhites in man-
agement and supervisory positions.
Principle 6-Improving the quality of employees' lives outside of work in
such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation,
and health facilities.
2 2
Unfortunately, the impact of the Sullivan Principles has been lim-
ited, largely because of South African laws, racially based job cate-
gories, pressures on corporate management in South Africa, and
the lack of enforcement mechanisms.23
The second form of corporate protest concerns corporate divest-
ment by investors who want to express disfavor with apartheid
and with American corporate complicity in it. Columbia Univer-
sity, Amherst College, Smith College, University of Wisconsin,24
and Tufts University all have divested themselves of either some
or all of their holdings in firms that do business in South Africa.
25
Although gaining some notoriety, the divestment movement has
had little practical effect on American corporate presence in South
Africa.26
In fact, shareholder resolutions and the corporate divestment
22. Note, University Investments with a South African Connection: Is Prudent
Divestiture Possible?, 11 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & Poi. 543, 547-48 (1979).
23. Id. at 548.
24. See Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1978, at 8, col. 1 (University of Wisconsin). The Uni-
versity of Wisconsin trustees decided to divest after being informed by the
Wisconsin Attorney General that continuing to hold stock in corporations do-
ing business in South Africa would violate Wis. STAT. § 36.29(1) (1975), which
forbids investments by the trustees in any corporation that discriminates on
the basis of race, religion, color, creed, or sex.
25. However, some university trustees have rescinded resolutions calling for the
sale of their stock in companies doing business with South Africa. See Wall
St. J., June 6, 1978, at 19, col 2 (discussing Miami (Ohio) University's rescis-
sion of its divestiture decision).
26. See §§ V & VI of text infra.
1981]
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movement have had little, if any, consequence on American busi-
ness in South Africa. While American corporations and their crit-
ics argue about the proper role for responsible business concerns,
American investment has continued to expand.27 Corporate offi-
cials have defended their investment in South Africa on the
grounds that (1) it is not the place of private corporations to judge
the internal affairs of another nation; (2) the purpose of a business
entity is to make profits for its owners, not moral judgments; 28 (3)
there are many other competitors available to trade with South Af-
rica;29 and (4) if anyone would be adversely affected by foreign
withdrawal, it would be the black population of South Africa.3O In
short, American businesses do not favor the termination of their
profitable operations in South Africa.
II. THE POLITICAL ARENA
Groups which consider American investment in South Africa to
be supportive of apartheid have used various political forums to
oppose it. Opponents have considered organizing an international
divestiture movement. A draft resolution calling for termination of
public and private financial ties to South Africa is currently before
the United Nations Security Council.31 Under this proposal, the
Security Council would prohibit loans, investments, and financial
guarantees for South Africa by governments and private busi-
ness. 3 2 In addition, the Council would call upon governments to
terminate all incentives for trade and investment in South Africa,
such as the export insurance provided by the United States Ex-
port-Import Bank.33
However, the main difficulties with trade and investment sanc-
tions at this level concern the criteria for Security Council consen-
sus and universal enforcement. The recently disclosed British
violations of Rhodesian sanctions demonstrate the lengths to
which nations can and will go to avoid sanctions which they be-
lieve work to their economic detriment.34 Even during the recent
27. Note, supra note 22, at 546.
28. South Africa: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 684 (1976) (statement of
Gilbert Jones).
29. Id. at 267 (statement of Dwight N. Wait).
30. Id.
31. Draft Resolution of Gagon, Mauritius and Nigeria, U.N. Doc. 5/12548 (1978).
32. Id.
33. Id. Export-import bank guarantees and insurance in South Africa were sus-
pended by the Export-Import Bank Act, Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 93-
630, tit. XIX, § 1901, 92 Stat. 3724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(9) (Supp. 1I
1978)).
34. Economist, Sept. 23, 1978, at 23-24 A recent report commissioned by the Brit-
[Vol. 60:304
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Iranian crisis, the United States was unable to convince its Euro-
pean allies to join in a trade embargo to precipitate the release of
the American hostages.
The United Nations Security Council has condemned apartheid
as a violation of human rights,35 and the United States is bound by
the U.N. Charter to follow that resolution.36 However, the Carter
Administration continued the longstanding American policy of
neither encouraging nor discouraging U.S. investment in South Af-
rica.3 7 Instead, it urged firms doing business in South Africa to
adopt progressive labor policies.
The U.S. government has consistently favored this limited ap-
proach and has opposed more drastic measures. However, Con-
gress has established a statutory framework for the prohibition on
arms exports to South Africa. The International Security Assist-
ance and Arms Export Control Act of 197638 "provides a compre-
hensive scheme for regulating arms sales both by the Government
and by private companies." 39
In part, this government response is based on political reality
and other factors beyond its control. As much as the Carter Ad-
ministration championed human rights as a world-wide issue,40 it
realized the importance of South Africa as a political ally. From its
unique geopolitical position, South Africa controls the shipping
routes around the Cape of Good Hope, which are vital for trans-
porting Persian Gulf oil upon which the West so heavily relies. In
ish government indicates that British oil companies, with the knowledge of
government officials, regularly violated Security Council sanctions and pro-
vided Rhodesia with a major source of oil until 1978. Id.
35. Security Council Res. 417,32 U.N. SCOR (2045th Mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF 2045
(1977).
36. U.N. CEARTER art. 41.
37. STAFF OF SENATE COMm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT
ON U.S. CORPORATE INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (Comm. Print 1978) [herein-
after cited as CLARK REPORT].
The newly elected Reagan administration has given some signals which
indicate a different attitude towards South Africa. In March 1981, President
Reagan said in a television interview that he favored good relations with
South Africa because it is a friendly hation of great strategic value. "Can we
abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we've ever fought, a
country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of
minerals we all must have and so forth." Wall St. J., March 23,1981, at 5, col 1.
In addition, the Reagan administration is seeking the repeal of the Clark
Amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Con-
trol Act of 1976, PJ. No. 94-329, tit. IV, § 404, 90 Stat. 957, which bars U.S.
assistance to rebel groups in Angola. Wall St. J., March 23, 1981, at 5, col 1.
38. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1976).
39. Mehlman, Milch & Toumanoff, United States Restrictions On Exports To
South Africa, 73 Am. J. INT'L I 581, 585 (1979).
40. See, e.g., President Carter's Address to the United Nations, N.Y. Times, Mar.
18, 1977, at 10, col. 1.
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addition, the Portuguese revolution and the subsequent with-
drawal of its forces from Mozambique and Angola left the United
States with few friends in southern Africa. South Africa also was
instrumental in the negotiated independence of Zimbabwe, her
neighbor to the north. However, the most important factor is that
South Africa controls huge reserves of natural resources, such as
deposits of platinum and chromite,41 which are vital to the West
and to the United States. The importance of those resources to the
American government should not be underestimated. Not long
ago, the United States signed a United Nations resolution which
called for an embargo of Rhodesia.42 Nevertheless, the United
States Congress voted to violate that embargo because of the need
to import chromium from Rhodesia.43
Thus, a combination of the American business community's de-
sire to avoid the apartheid issue and the federal government's un-
willingness to challenge American support of apartheid might have
led one to expect the controversy to die quietly. However, this was
not to be the case.
III. STATE ACTION
Critics of apartheid have found surprising support for their ef-
forts in certain state legislatures. Last year, the Nebraska legisla-
ture proved especially responsive. While one could expect the
rather conservative Nebraska lawmakers to be generally disinter-
ested in an international political controversy, during the 1980 ses-
sion they passed a resolution which condemned apartheid in
South Africa.4 4
Legislative Resolution 43, introduced by State Senators Cham-
bers45 and Fowler and adopted 28-0,46 declared that the investment
of state funds in institutions which support the South African
apartheid system is contrary to Nebraska's stand on human rights
41. Nickel, The Case For Doing Business In South Africa, FORTUNE, June 19, 1978,
at 62.
42. Security Council Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR (1428th Mtg.) 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
23/Rev. 1 (1968).
43. Act of Nov. 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 503, 85 Stat. 427 (amending 50
U.S.C. § 98h-1 (1970)) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 98h-4 (1976)) (commonly
known as the Byrd Amendment) (repealed with respect to Rhodesia, 22
U.S.C. § 287(c) (1978)). The Byrd Amendment allowed United States imports
of Rhodesian chromium for "strategic" purposes.
44. Neb. Legis. Res. 43, 86th Legis., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Resolu-
tion 431. Resolutions of the Nebraska Legislature are not binding laws. NEB.
CONST. art. 3, § 13.
45. State Senator Ernest Chambers was the only black member of the Nebraska
Legislature during the 1980 session. NEBRAsKA LEGMLAT vE CouNcIL, NE-
BRASKA BLUE BooK 245 (1978-1979).
46. 1980 NEB. LEGis. J., 86th Legis., 2d Sess. 1596.
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and social equality.47 In addition, the Resolution asked the Invest-
ment Council, which oversees investment of Nebraska's trust
funds by the state investment officer, to review the list of approved
investments and to remove the names of those, corporations and
banks that invest in South Africa.48
During debate on the Resolution, the market value of Ne-
braska's 1979 holdings in U.S. parent corporations investing in
South Africa was established at approximately twenty-five million
dollars. 49 In commenting upon the Resolution, the Nebraska In-
vestment Officer suggested that the withdrawal of investments
from such firms would have no measurable effect on South African
racial policies, but would reduce Nebraska's investment opportuni-
ties.50 This is an interesting view, for it closely parallels a frequent
American corporate response to charges that investment in South
Africa supports apartheid policies; that is, the purpose of a busi-
ness entity is to make profits for its owners, not moral judgments.
Just as private investors expect corporations to maximize the re-
turn on their investment capital, those who have funds invested by
the state investment officer also expect the maximum return on
their investments. However, in a private corporation a majority of
shareholders may establish investment policies which reflect their
position on moral issues, despite the danger that such "princi-
pled" investments may yield less than maximum returns. In Reso-
lution 43, the Nebraska Legislature made a similar determination
regarding the investment of public funds.
Although divestment by Nebraska would withdraw only a rela-
tively small amount of capital from certain corporations, substan-
tially more funds would be withdrawn if more states, including
those which control substantially more capital, were to enact simi-
lar legislation.5 ' Such legislation has been considered in Ilinois,52
47. Resolution 43, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Resolution 43: Hearing on L.R. 43 Before the Banking, Commerce & Insurance
Comm., 86th Legis., 2d Sess. 2 (1979) (statement of Steve Fowler) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearing on Resolution 43].
50. Id. at 32 (statement of Don Mathes).
51. The Michigan state treasurer has reported that the state's pension fund has
approximately $400 million invested in corporations with South African con-
nections. He further reported that disinvestment would require the reinvest-
ment of nearly one billion dollars, with a loss of $73.2 million to state pension
funds. Detroit News, Mar. 31, 1980, § B, at 1, col 1.
52. H.B. 1256 (1980). This bill would have prevented the deposit of state monies
in banks making loans to South Africa and would have affected some $150
million in the First National Bank of Chicago and the Continental Illinois
Bank and Trust. The bill did not receive a sympathetic hearing. Centre
Against Apartheid, Dep't of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Na-
tions, March, 1981.
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Michigan,53 and Minnesota.5 4 Michigan was the first state to take
action in this area. Michigan Resolution 462, adopted February 6,
1978, urged Congress to impose immediate sanctions against the
South African government as a response to that country's disre-
gard for human rights and dignity.5 5 However, the legislation cur-
rently before these state legislatures no longer asks Congress to
respond, but rather requires state action.
State divestment would touch mainly funds on deposit at
banks, state educational funds, and state pension funds.56 Support
for divestment legislation in these states has come primarily from
church groups, universities, and labor unions. For example, the
National Council of Churches' governing board declared its sup-
port for efforts to end all economic collaboration between South
Africa and the United States government, and for the withdrawal
of all funds in financial institutions which have investments in
South Africa or which make loans to the South African govern-
ment.57 The AFL-CIO Executive Council has asked that all U.S.
corporations immediately divest themselves of South African affili-
ates and sever all ties with South African corporations.5 8 In addi-
tion, Douglas Fraser, president of the 1.5 million member United
Auto Workers has announced that the union would withdraw
funds from institutions making loans to South Africa.59
When considering such legislative pronouncements as Resolu-
tion 43, one should remember that a resolution is only a statement
of the legislature's opinion.60 Nevertheless, although the Resolu-
tion is not a law,6 1 it may be interpreted as a statement of legisla-
tive intent to move toward a policy of divestment.62 The legislation
contemplated in other states63 would have the effect of law. Of ma-
jor importance in assessing the significance of this divestment ac-
53. H.B. 5446, 80th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1980).
54. Senator Allan Spear has introduced such a bill in the Minnesota Senate, and
Representative Phyllis Kahn has introduced a similar bill in the Minnesota
House of Representatives.
55. H.R. Con. Res. 462, 78th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1978).
56. Hearing on Resolution 43, supra note 49, at 30-31.
57. SOUTHERN AFRICA PERSPECTIVEs, No. 1, 1978, at 5 (The Africa Fund, pub-
lisher) (reprinting statement of National Council of Churches governing
board, adopted Nov. 10, 1977).
58. Id. (reprinting AFL-CIO Executive Council statement of Feb. 24, 1978).
59. Id. (reprinting statement of Douglas A. Fraser, president of United Auto
Workers, Mar. 3, 1978).
60. See generally Hawks v. Bland, 156 Okla. 48, 48, 9 P.2d 720, 721 (1932).
61. See generally Van Hoveenberg v. Holeman, 201 Ark. 370, 374, 144 S.W.2d 718,
721 (1940).
62. See generally W.B. Gibson Co. v. Warren Metro. Hous. Auth., 65 Ohio App. 84,
87, 29 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1940).
63. See notes 52-54 supra.
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tivity is that these states are now considering enforceable
legislation to bring about their goals.6 4
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF RESOLUTION 43
Despite the commendable intentions of its drafters, Resolution
43 may violate the commerce clause 65 of the United States Consti-
tution. However, in order to question the Resolution's constitu-
tionality, the challenger would have to establish his standing to
sue.66 Although the focus of this article precludes an analysis of
how to establish standing, it is nevertheless appropriate to note
this substantial obstacle to any constitutional challenge. 67 Simi-
larly, a potential challenger also must bring a claim which is 'ripe"
for adjudication,68 a requirement which could preclude a constitu-
tional attack mounted solely on the ground that the Resolution
may cause injury at some future date. Although these require-
ments are somewhat collateral to the following discussion, their
importance should not be underestimated.
An analysis of whether Resolution 43 violates the commerce
clause must begin with the preliminary question of whether Reso-
lution 43 "regulates commerce" within the meaning of the clause.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the commerce clause broadly,
observing that "to regulate commerce is to prescribe.., the condi-
tions upon which it shall be conducted; to determine how far it
shall be free and untrammeled, how far it shall be burdened by
duties and imposts, and how far it shall be prohibited."69 Because
the Resolution's principal purpose is to discourage investment in
South Africa through withholding state funds from corporations
64. Id.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 3. The clause provides, as one of the enumerated
legislative powers, that Congress shall have power to 'regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations." Id.
66. Generally, to have standing to sue, the party must have "alleged such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete ad-
verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See generally J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONsTrrToNAL LAw 68-83 (1978).
67. Cf. Note, Constitutionality of the No Discrimination Clause Regulating Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Investments, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 1059. The author suggests
that a similar statute, Wis. STAT. § 36.29(1) (1975), may go unchallenged be-
cause no party will suffer the concrete injury required to establish standing.
Id. at 1070.
68. The ripeness doctrine requires that the plaintiff state a claim which is so ma-
ture as to make 4t unnecessary for the court to speculate as to how the law
might be applied to a particular set of facts. See generally J. NowAi, R Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 66, at 64-66.
69. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875).
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which make such investments, it seems clear that it regulates com-
merce within the meaning of the commerce clause.
A second preliminary question is whether Resolution 43 applies
to activity which constitutes "commerce." The Supreme Court has
defined commerce as "something more than traffic-it is inter-
course."7 0 Subsequent decisions have held that Congress may,
under the commerce clause, regulate various types of interstate ac-
tivity, or even intrastate conduct which affects interstate com-
merce.7 ' In light of this expansive interpretation, it is likely that
Nebraska's investment of public funds in commercial institutions
would constitute "commerce" under the commerce clause.
However, predicting the result of a challenge to Resolution 43
based on the commerce clause is no easy task, for courts' reactions
to state laws which affect foreign commerce have varied from case
to case.7 2 The United States Supreme Court now appears willing
to tolerate certain types of state regulation of foreign commerce,
despite its earlier opposition to any such regulation. Nevertheless,
the following analysis will reveal several grounds upon which Res-
olution 43 might be found to violate the commerce clause.
In the landmark case of Brown v. Maryland,73 the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a Maryland act 74 which imposed a tax
upon importers of foreign-made goods. The defendants, who had
been convicted for selling foreign dry goods without the requisite
license contended, inter alia, that the Maryland act unconstitu-
tionally encroached upon Congress's exclusive power over com-
merce.75 In holding the Maryland act repugnant to the commerce
clause, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall,
disapproved of state regulation of commerce with foreign na-
tions, 76 largely because it feared that federal power would be dan-
gerously weakened if states were permitted to independently
regulate their commercial relationships with foreign countries. 77
70. The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 348 (1903).
71. See generally J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 66, at 150.
72. Compare Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), and Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969), with K.S.B.
Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J.
272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
73. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
74. The Act supplemented an act imposing duties on licenses to retailers of dry
goods. Ch. 246, § 2, 1821 Md. Laws. The Act required that "all importers of
foreign articles or commodities, of dry goods, wares, or merchandise ...
shall, before they are authorized to sell, take out a license, as by the original
act is directed, for which they shall pay fifty dollars .... " 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) at 436.
75. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 436-37.
76. Id. at 448-49.
77. Id. at 446.
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In commenting upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce,
Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It is not, therefore, matter of
surprise, that the grant should be as extensive as the mischief, and
should comprehend all foreign commerce....-78
Several subsequent Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed
the rule announced in Brown.7 9 For example, in United States v.
Belmont,80 the Court observed that "[g] overnmental power over
internal affairs is distributed between the national government
and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs
is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national govern-
ment."8 1
The danger inherent in state regulation of foreign commerce
has not declined since the era of John Marshall. One author re-
cently concluded that such regulation, when viewed from a na-
tional perspective, is problematic for two principal reasons.8 2
First, state-imposed regulations which burden commercial activity
with a foreign country may precipitate a response from that coun-
try which affects all states, not just the state which imposed the
regulation. 83 Consequently, "the nation, not the state, would have
to answer for state created difficulties with foreign powers."84 Sec-
ondly, the foreign nation's response to a state regulation is not lim-
ited by the constitutional constraints which restrict the responses
of an American state to regulations on commerce imposed by other
states.85 This could result in the imposition of retaliatory regula-
tions by foreign countries which, in turn, could have substantial
adverse affects on the national level. Moreover, as the dependency
of the United States upon foreign nations for raw materials has
grown, the importance of maintaining healthy relationships with
other nations has also increased.
Despite Brown v. Maryland and its progeny, other decisions
have sustained the constitutionality of state statutes which regu-
late commerce with foreign countries. While the following cases
are factually distinguishable from the type of case which could
arise under Resolution 43, they nevertheless provide some support
for finding that Resolution 43 may be constitutional.
78. Id.
79. E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275, 280 (1875).
80. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
81. Id. at 330.
82. Note, Foreign Commerce and State Power: The Constitutionality of State Buy
American Statutes, 12 ConRELL INT. L.J. 109, 117 (1979).
83. Id.
84. Recent Decisions, 6 TEx. INT. L.F. 134, 138 (1970).
85. Note, supra note 82, at 117.
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Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan86 has been cited as principal
authority for the view that states are not absolutely precluded
from enacting regulations which affect foreign commerce. 87 In
Bob-Lo, the defendant owned a small Canadian island, commonly
known as "Bob-Lo," which was only fifteen miles upstream from
Detroit on the Detroit River. The defendant operated an amuse-
ment park on the island which served Detroit residents who
reached the island via the defendant's two steamships. The park
was open to everyone except those who were either disorderly or
black. The case arose when the defendant refused a black woman
passage on one of the steamships and, as a result, was prosecuted
and convicted under the Michigan Civil Rights Act.88 On appeal,
the defendant argued that application of the Michigan Civil Rights
Act to his steamship operation between Detroit and the Canadian
island constituted state regulation of foreign commerce in viola-
tion of the federal commerce clause.8 9 The Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of applying the Michigan Act to the defendant's
conduct, which was found to be "foreign commerce" within the
meaning of the Constitution.90
The Court's decision in Bob-Lo was based upon certain findings
which would be difficult to establish should Resolution 43 be chal-
lenged under the commerce clause. In Bob-Lo, the Court empha-
sized that the island was used exclusively by residents of Detroit
and was, in effect, an extension of Detroit which was more impor-
tant to Michigan than to Canada.9' The Court also noted that the
Michigan Civil Rights Act was consistent with both federal policy
and Canadian law.92 Those findings may be contrasted with the
relationship which exists between the United States and South Af-
rica. Resolution 43 was intended to undermine indirectly a legal
policy which discriminates against South African blacks. Yet it di-
rectly affects few if any Americans. The opposite was true in Bob-
Lo, where the defendant's discriminatory practices were directed
exclusively at American blacks.
A second distinction emerges when the relationship between
the Michigan Civil Rights Act and Canadian law is compared with
the relationship between the South African policy of apartheid and
86. 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
87. Recent Decisions, supra note 84, at 140-41.
88. 333 U.S. at 31. The Michigan Civil Rights Act, McH. Com'. LAws §§ 17115-146
to -148 (Supp. 1940), prohibited any proprietor of a means of public transpor-
tation or amusement from withholding such services on account of race,
creed, or color. 333 U.S. at 32.
89. 333 U.S. at 34.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 36.
92. Id. at 37.
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Resolution 43's opposition to racial discrimination. From the Bob-
Lo finding that the Michigan Act was consistent with Canadian
law,93 one can reasonably infer that a different result might have
been obtained had the laws of Michigan and Canada been in con-
flict. Because the objectives of Resolution 43 conflict with South
African law, the Resolution may violate the commerce clause by
conditioning American commerce with South Africa on terms (Le.,
the abolition of apartheid) which are unacceptable to that country.
The Court further noted that the amusement park's discrimina-
tory policies affected Michigan residents almost exclusively.94
Thus, it would have been anomalous to have held unconstitutional
the application of an act which protected the rights of Americans,
yet neither conflicted with Canadian law nor affected Canadian cit-
izens other than the defendant. Those facts are clearly distin-
guishable from the situation arising from an application of
Resolution 43. The Resolution is intended not to protect the rights
of Americans, but rather to advance the rights of blacks in South
Africa. Additionally, the impact of the Resolution, if successful,
will be felt almost exclusively by South Africans.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Bob-Lo Court ob-
served that the application of the Michigan statute to the defend-
ant's conduct could not reasonably be found to adversely affect
any national interest.95 Canadian law was harmonious with the
Michigan Act; consequently, the Court was unable to see how the
prosecution of the defendant under Michigan law could lead to a
hostile Canadian reaction directed at the United States. However,
adherence to the policy of Resolution 43 might precipitate an ad-
verse South African reaction directed at the United States rather
than at Nebraska alone. While it is hard to believe that the action
of a single state could provoke a hostile response, such a response
would be more likely should several states enact legislation similar
to Resolution 43. In light of American dependence upon South Af-
rica for certain resources, any state action which might jeopardize
our national access to those resources would appear to be uncon-
stitutional, especially under Brown v. Maryland.96
While Bob-Lo indicates that states are not absolutely prohib-
ited from regulating "foreign commerce," the legislation chal-
lenged in that case is clearly distinguishable from Resolution 43.
Therefore, it is useful to apply a commerce clause analysis to Reso-
lution 43. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. ,97 the Court articulated the
93. Id.
94. Id. at 40.
95. Id.
96. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
97. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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following test for state statutes which affect interstate commerce:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate lo-
cal purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.98
Although Pike held an Arizona act to be unconstitutional as an un-
reasonable burden on interstate commerce, the Court's decision in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 99 indicated a willingness to apply the
preceding test, or at least portions of it, to cases involving the con-
stitutionality of state regulations affecting foreign commerce. 00
In Ray, a federal district court had held that a Washington law
regulating the size, design, and movement of oil tankers in Puget
Sound violated the supremacy and commerce clauses of the Fed-
eral Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
finding that certain provisions were preempted by federal regula-
tion, yet sustained the constitutionality of provisions requiring tug
boat escorts for tankers in certain instances.lOl The Court rea-
soned that such regulations need not be nationally uniform. More-
over, the cost imposed by the regulations upon tankers was so
slight that it "in no way impede [d] the free flow of interstate and
foreign commerce."'10 2
The Pike test and the preceding findings may be profitably ap-
plied to and contrasted with the likely effects of Resolution 43. Ini-
tially it must be recognized that Resolution 43 is intended to
promote an interest which is largely, if not exclusively, foreign in
nature. Conceivably, Nebraskans may derive some satisfaction
from knowing that their legislation has advanced the cause of
human rights in South Africa. However, it is hard to believe that
this satisfaction constitutes a "legitimate local public interest" as
envisioned by Pike.103
Resolution 43 appears to be especially questionable in light of
the second element of the Pike test, which permits only an "inci-
dental burden" on commerce. The Resolution will not merely bur-
den the flow of commerce between the United States and South
Africa; if successful, it would substantially reduce investment by
American institutions in South Africa. While incidental burdens
on commerce have been tolerated as relatively harmless side ef-
fects of otherwise valid regulations, the principal objective of this
98. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
99. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
100. Id. at 179-80.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See generally Note, supra note 67, at 1064.
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Resolution is to discourage institutions from investing in South Af-
rica.
Finally, under the Pike test, no statute is constitutional if the
burden it imposes upon commerce exceeds the local benefits it
yields.X04 If the Resolution is measured under this standard, fur-
ther doubt is cast upon its constitutionality, for its local benefits
appear minimal compared with its substantial burden on foreign
commerce.
Resolution 43 may also be invalid under the supremacy
clause.105 One author has concluded that a similar Wisconsin stat-
ute106 is unconstitutional because it violates the exclusive power of
the federal government in foreign affairs.107 That conclusion is
based largely upon an application of the test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Zschernig v. Miller.108
In Zschernig, the appellants, East German residents who were
the sole heirs of an Oregon resident, sought to receive the
decendent's property under the Oregon law of intestate distribu-
tion. However, members of the State Land Board contended that
the decedent's property should escheat to the state because the
appellants could not satisfy the requirements of Oregon law,109
which restricted the rights of non-resident aliens to claim property
left by deceased Oregon residents. In holding the statute unconsti-
tutional, the Supreme Court concluded that it made "unavoidable
judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian
basis than our own."1 10 The Court further relied upon the lan-
104. 397 U.S. at 142.
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: 'Ihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land. .. ."
106. Wis. STAT. § 36.29(1) (1975): "No such investment shall knowingly be made in
any company, corporation, subsidiary or affiliate which practices or condones
through its actions discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, creed,
or sex."
107. Note, supra note 67, at 1066.
108. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
109. O. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957). The Supreme Court restated the require-
ments of the Oregon statute:
(1) the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to
take property on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the
foreign country;
(2) the right of United States citizens to receive payment here of
funds from estates in the foreign country; and
(3) the right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of Oregon
estates "without confiscation."
389 U.S. at 430-31.
110. 389 U.S. at 440.
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guage of Hines v. Davidowitz,"' where it had observed that
"[e]xperience has shown that international controversies of the
gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from
real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permit-
ted by a government."112
The preceding language provides a solid foundation for finding
that Resolution 43 violates the supremacy clause, especially when
read in conjunction with the Court's statement that responsibility
for foreign affairs is entrusted solely to the federal government.113
Resolution 43 unequivocally condemned the South African govern-
ment for enforcing the policy of apartheid. Moreover, supporters
of the Resolution hoped that it would adversely effect that country
and precipitate the abolition of apartheid. If successful, the Reso-
lution could provoke a hostile South African response in the form
of an embargo on resources vital to the United States. Thus, ad-
herence to Resolution 43 may violate the Federal Constitution by
involving the State of Nebraska in establishing American foreign
policy.
Closely related to the doctrine of federal supremacy is that of
federal preemption. Although the Supreme Court has articulated
various standards for determining whether federal preempts state
legislation,114 the test set out in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 115
is especially applicable to Resolution 43 because it affects foreign
affairs, an area traditionally dominated by the federal government.
In Rice, the Court observed that state legislation may affect a field
"in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal sys-
tem will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject."1 6 Because the federal government has promul-
gated a variety of laws and regulations which affect American com-
mercial intercourse with South Africa,"17 a court could reasonably
conclude that Nebraska is precluded from enacting legislation
which affects that relationship. Similarly, Nebraska should not as-
sume that it may attempt to regulate American investment in
South Africa merely because the federal government has failed to
do so. The lack of federal restrictions on certain aspects of Ameri-
can commercial intercourse with South Africa is intended to pro-
mote a relationship with that country which will assure continued
American access to vital resources. 1i8 Consequently, legislation,
111. 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
112. 389 U.S. at 441 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 64).
113. 389 U.S. at 436.
114. See generally J. NowAx, P. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNo, supra note 66, at 267.
115. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
116. Id. at 230.
117. See generally Mehiman, Milch & Toumanoff supra note 39, at 581.
118. Id.
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such as Resolution 43, which could jeopardize that relationship is,
in all likelihood, preempted by federal law. That is, however, a
somewhat speculative conclusion, for the Supreme Court is not
likely to find a state law preempted when its conflict with federal
law is unripe," 9 or when congressional intent to dominate a field is
unclear.120
V. THE SOUTH AFRICAN REACTION
The South African reaction to the divestment movement in the
United States has been mixed. The South Africa Foundation, a
non-governmental research group reporting on matters affecting
South Africa, conducted a year-long detailed investigation into the
divestment movement. One of its main conclusions was that the
potential of the movement is more serious than most South Afri-
cans realize.' 2 ' Its report included the following findings:
There are now more than 2,000 local, state, regional and national organiza-
tions across the United States committed to some action in this area.
These groups have a total financial power-operating funds, institutional
support and personal donations--estimated at nearly [$100,000,0001.
In 1978 and 1979 alone, they were able to compel United States universities
to divest [$50 million] in stock.
They have succeeded in getting nearly all major United States banks to
stop lending money to the South African government and to parastatal
corporations.1 2 2
A total of thirty-five of the United States' fifty states now have
some kind of organizational network devoted to the anti-apartheid
movement. Consequently, the Foundation report was very con-
cerned about the growth of the divestment movement in the
United States and the effects that the movement could have on
South Africa in the immediate future.
A somewhat different response came from the Rand Daily Mail
after the passage of the Nebraska resolution. The newspaper rec-
ognized that the divestment resolution condemned South African
apartheid, but questioned whether proponents of divestment fully
realized where this might lead. 23 The newspaper contended that
divestment, if taken to its logical conclusion and applied on a suffi-
ciently wide scale, would create the danger of wide-spread social
unrest in South Africa.124 It suggested that social unrest, economic
119. J. NowAr, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 66, at 270.
120. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
121. Disinvestment campaign in U.S. against SA 'serious,' Star (Johannesburg),
Apr. 19, 1980, at 1, col. 4 (int'l ed.).
122. Id.
123. An ominous vote in America, Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), Apr. 11, 1980,
at 8, col 1 (editorial). The Rand Daily Mail is perhaps the most influential
English language newspaper in South Africa.
124. Id.
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decline, and greater unemployment would preclude a peaceful res-
olution of the controversy over South African apartheid, so the di-
vestment movement would not be desirable for South Africa or for
anyone who wishes to avoid violence and destruction. In the view
of the newspaper, rapid economic development and meaningful
change are the only ways to halt divestment and save the coun-
try.12 5
The South African Government's response is reflected in recent
statements made by Vere Stock, the South African Consul-Gen-
eral in New York. Mr. Stock is convinced that South Africa has
won the battle against pressure groups in the United States which
oppose investment in South Africa.12 6 In a statement to the press,
Mr. Stock said:
Major United States companies are still under pressure on the campuses
and at shareholder meetings, where there is still a lot of activity. But we
have passed through the roughest time. It would be an overstatement to
suggest that the disinvestment campaign has been defused. But we have
come through the watershed period, at the very least.1 2 7
This cross-section of South African opinion regarding the di-
vestment movement in the United States should be considered in
view of recent history in southern Africa. Since the Portuguese
Revolution in 1974, South Africa has become increasingly isolated
in the world community,12 8 a feeling intensified by the recent grant
of independence to Zimbabwe.129 In Afrikaans, the word laager
refers to the formation used by the early Dutch settlers in which
they would make a circle of their wagons when under attack.130
This word has recently come into greater use by South Africans
who believe that, should the rest of the world wish to shun them,
they will circle their wagons and prepare for the outside attack. In
light of the prevailing psychology in South Africa, one must ques-
tion whether the divestment movement, if successful, could bring
about the desired result: the peaceful end to apartheid.
125. Id.
126. Disinvestment battle won, South African Digest, May 30, 1980, at 6, col. 3.
127. Id.
128. As a result of the Portugese Revolution, Mozambique gained its indepen-
dence in 1974, and Angola received its independence in 1976 after a long battle
for power among various rival groups.
129. Zimbabwe gained its independence in April 1980 from Great Britain. In 1965,
Rhodesia had made a unilateral declaration of independence, which went un-
recognized by the rest of the world community and was the cause for United
Nations-sponsored trade sanctions and economic embargo. A guerrilla war
for independence started in 1973 after talks between Ian Smith and Joshua
Nkomo regarding an end to racial discrimination broke down.
130. Both Afrikaans and English are official languages of South Africa. Afrikaans
is a derivative of the Dutch language which was an official language until 1925.
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VI. DIVESTMENT-THE PROBABLE RESULTS
Despite the widespread American disdain of apartheid, Ameri-
can investment in South Africa increased by 300% between 1960
and 1975.131 Furthermore, "American firms provide 70% of the
computers used in South Africa, 43% of its petroleum, and 23% of
its automobiles. United States firms employ approximately 100,000
South Africans, 70% of whom are black."3 2
In light of these statistics, the question must be asked: "What
would be the effect of divestment on South Africa?" An analysis
suggests that the increase in American investment in South Africa
is impressive only because the original figure in 1960 was so low.
The United States has not been one of South Africa's traditional
trading partners, which explains the low 1960 investment figures.
Great Britain and West Germany have been and remain South Af-
rica's most important trading partners 33 and exhibit no inclination
to withdraw from that position.
Concerning the computers, petroleum, automobiles, and other
products that South Africa imports, it has long been believed that
petroleum is the Achilles heel of South Africa. 34 However, South
Africa depends upon petroleum for only about 20% of its energy
requirements. 35 Coal, which South Africa has in abundance, re-
mains the primary energy source. Moreover, South Africa has an-
ticipated potential oil embargoes by stockpiling petroleum
reserves. 13 6 Current oil supplies can provide South Africa with an
estimated three- 37 to six-year38 cushion against any embargo.
Additionally, the South African Oil, Coal and Gas Corporation,
known as Sasol, is a world leader in the production of synthetic
fuels deprived from coal; this provides an additional buffer against
any possible embargo. 39
These factors, along with a general inability of apartheid oppo-
nents to muster coordinated international trade and investment
sanctions, 40 make it clear that any embargo or divestment of busi-
131. CLAM REPORT, supra note 37, at 8.
132. Note, supra note 22, at 547 (citing CLARK REPORT, supra note 37).
133. See Nickel, supra note 41, at 62.
134. Malan, South Africa and Economic Sanctions, South African Digest, March
13, 1981, at 2 (Supp.).
135. A. SEIDmAN & N. SEmAN, SOUTH AFRICA AND U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS 63 (1978).
136. CLARK REPORT, supra note 37, at 57; Malan, supra note 134, at 2.
137. Malan, supra note 134, at 2.
138. Economist, June 17, 1978, at 97.
139. It was one of these Sasol installations that was raided by urban guerrillas,
who set off explosions causing more than $7.3 million of damage. See Wall St.
J., June 3, 1980, at 16, coL 3.
140. See notes 31-34 & accompanying text supra.
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ness by the United States would have little effect on the South Af-
rican economy. During the recent worldwide embargo of trade
with Rhodesia,141 that country had little problem obtaining
whatever goods it could not produce itself and, ironically, became
more self-sufficient than ever before. A similar embargo of South
Africa, a country far more prepared for such a possibility and far
more self-sufficient than Rhodesia was, seems ill-advised on a
practical level.142
Lastly, there is the matter of the 70,000 black South Africans
employed by American corporations. The American divestment
movement asks that if U.S. companies cannot effectively abide by
the Sullivan Principles,143 then it is their corporate responsibility
to withdraw from South Africa and not cooperate with the
apartheid regime. However, should this suggestion be followed, it
would be black South African workers who would be most ad-
versely affected by the American corporate withdrawal. In a coun-
try whose total black population is about 18 million people, 4 4 an
additional 70,000 people unemployed will bring little relief to a pop-
ulation already struggling with high unemployment.145
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States has a history of serious racial problems, yet
it is the home of a movement which seeks to impose its belief in
racial equality on other nations.146 The American divestment
movement has taken upon itself the task of imposing corporate re-
sponsibility on corporate managers doing business with the Re-
public of South Africa. It disregards the fact that the South
African situation differs from the situation in this country and that
apartheid is an internal domestic problem of a sovereign nation.
The propriety of mandatory divestment must be seriously ques-
tioned on two principal grounds. First, current demands for divest-
141. See Security Council Res. 253, supra note 42.
142. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1977, § 3, at 1, col. 1. "South African Finance Minister
Horwood says the South African government would not be forced to its
knees by withdrawal of American capital, and [former] U.S. Ambassador
Young has stated that South Africa is one of the most self-sufficient countries
in the world." Id.
143. See Note, supra note 22, at 547-48.
144. S. VAN DER MERWE, supra note 10, at 55.
145. A nationwide survey by the Department of Statistics found that half a million
economically active blacks are out of work today in South Africa. See Star
(Johannesburg), May 24, 1980, at 3, col. 5 (int'l ed.). But see L.A. Times, April
9, 1978, § V, at 2, col. 1.
146. In view of the racial confrontation that occurred in 1980 in Miami, Fla., one
might question how much progress has been made in this country toward the
peaceful integration of the races.
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ment come when the United States is growing ever more
dependent upon foreign countries for vital natural resources.
American dependence upon South African platinum and chromite
should not be ignored, but must be included in a balancing test
which weighs the benefits of divestment against the risks it may
create. Such a balancing suggests that widespread American di-
vestment may risk resource shortages which will be borne largely
by the American people, while the hoped-for, but unlikely, benefits
will be enjoyed exclusively by South African blacks. Thus, Ameri-
can dependence upon South African resources should temper the
American reaction to the deplorable practice of apartheid in South
Africa.
Second, divestment is ill-advised, for it may precipitate an eco-
nomic decline in South Africa which will have the most adverse
affect upon South African blacks. Instead of advocating divest-
ment, opponents of apartheid should strive to organize interna-
tional diplomatic and political pressure which would threaten to
isolate South Africa in the international community.147 Finally, op-
ponents of apartheid might provide direct support to those South
African resistance movements which oppose apartheid.l48 How-
ever, despite these alternatives, the divestment movement has
continued to express its opposition to American corporate involve-
ment with South Africa's apartheid regime.
Finding only minimal corporate support through shareholder
resolutions and institutional withdrawal of funds,149 supporters of
divestment have tried to persuade the federal government to act.
The response has been constrained by various political and eco-
nomic concerns: Washington too has failed to meet the goals of the
divestment movement. However, somewhat surprisingly, certain
state legislatures have responded positively to the movement. Un-
fortunately, such divestment legislation as Nebraska's Resolution
43 may be held unconstitutional as violative of the commerce or
supremacy clauses of the Federal Constitution. State regulation of
foreign commerce has been upheld in only a few instances, while
federal supremacy in the area of foreign affairs is an established
doctrine.
The reaction in South Africa to the recent events in this country
has been mixed. Nevertheless, if the peaceful abolition of
147. Feimpong & Tiewel, Can Apartheid Successfully Defy the International Legal
System?, 5 BLACK I.J. 287, 310 (1977).
148. Id.
149. Perhaps the most publicized corporate cooperation with the divestment
movement came when Polaroid Corporation agreed to withdraw all of its op-
erations because its film was being used by the South African police to en-
force the pass laws.
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apartheid is the goal of the divestment movement, it is time to re-
view the practicality of pursuing this goal through divestment. In
light of the South African state of mind and previous attempts at
economic embargo by both the United Nations and this country,
one must wonder if this is the best way of achieving the stated
goal. The system of formal apartheid in South Africa is morally
reprehensible and unjust in that it deprives millions of people of
their basic human rights, but one must question whether divest-
ment will have any positive effect.
